A Conference Addressing the Issues of Balancing Public Safety and Protection of Our Nation's Heritage
Tuesday, January 22, 2002
The Washington Capital Hilton Hotel

Brake, Pete	**Security of Museum Collections** By **Pete Brake**, CPP, Huntsville, AL, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers **Summary of Remarks:** When creating security in museums, the countermeasures process should include the following steps. First, the threats facing the collection must be defined. Next, the specific vulnerabilities of the collection should be identified. Finally, the precise objectives of the security plan should be laid out clearly. Threat analysis consists of several different steps as well. Before you can determine what risks are at hand, you must be aware of what assets you possess, all of which should be defined and listed, including collections themselves, as well as the personnel and equipment on the premises. Having accomplished that, potential adversaries must be identified, determining who would be the most likely to attack the collection. Finally, the actions themselves must be weighed. Every possible attack should be considered, with the adverse consequences of each determined along with the likelihood of that attack actually occurring. Next, having defined the threats, the vulnerabilities of the collection must be determined, so appropriate response can be tailored. The only reliable way of doing this is to perform a full-site survey, directly gathering information about the site and its vulnerabilities. Finally, the security objectives must be defined. Ultimately, an effective objective involves three layers. The first should focus on preventative measures, using countermeasures to reduce the probability of an adverse event. Should these measures fail to prevent the occurance, however, some thought must be given to contingencies, focusing on reducing the consequences of an adverse action. Even the best laid plans, however, may not be sufficient to totally eliminate the threat, and the last layer involves an acceptance that there is always a certain risk. The functional elements of an effective security system include adequate methods of detection, assessment, and delay, to give a well-trained and maintained response force time to arrive on scene. Well-trained, because museum collections face special security concerns few other locations must deal with. They have a public access requirement, so the site and exhibit displays must be protected while keeping the visiting experience pleasant. Many of the structures are artworks themselves, and there is the issue of separating public and private areas, as well as dealing with the intellectual staff members regularly present on the site.

Castro, Bernadette	**Learning from New York** By **Bernadette Castro**, Vice Chairman, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation; Commissioner, New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation **Summary of Remarks:** Often, a site is considered historic not so much because of its age, but because of its role in an important event. The World Trade Center, for instance, was not eligible for the National Register, having only been erected thirty years ago, but was made "historic" by its destruction on September 11. However, a few other historic sites (using the traditional definition) did cause concern in the aftermath of the attacks. Federal Hall, the nation's first seat of government, where George Washington took his first Presidential Oath, received some structural damage following the attacks, but apparently Congress will be providing funding for its restoration. Ms. Castro singles out ACHP Chairman John Nau for congratulations in calling attention to the plight of Federal Hall, and for making possible the funds to restore it. The other historic site imperiled by the September 11 attacks, St. Paul's Chapel, built in 1764, was miraculously left standing, despite its close proximity to ground zero. Also important in the unfolding events of September 11th were two more National Register-listed objects: two fireboats, the "John J. Harvey" and the "Fire Fighter," which evacuated fleeing people, and pumped the only available water to the site, allowing fire fighters to combat the blaze. Without the help of committed, passionate leadership like NYC Mayor Giuliani, Governor Pataki, and President Bush, the damage in both lives and historic resources could have been far greater. As leader of the NYS Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation, Ms. Castro was responsible for the donation of hundreds of hours of Office aid and supplies, and for the conversion of space in Riverbank State Park into temporary housing. As New York's SHPO, Ms. Castro states that, even given the urgency of rebuilding lower Manhattan, the importance of historic reviews should not be sacrificed, and that rebuilding must be accomplished in a manner that will not adversely affect historic properties. But these reviews must be carried out promptly and not hinder efforts to improve security or restore the economic livelihood of the area. Since taking over the Office, Ms. Castro has streamlined the review process, and improved working relationships between her Office and other state and federal agencies, greatly improving the reputation of her Office, and increasing the weight its recommendations carried. On September 11th, working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the SHPO completed an historic building survey of the affected areas, spearheaded by Dr. Robert Kuhn, a survey which was subsequently used as the basis of a programmatic agreement with FEMA. FEMA has continued to work with the NY SHPO to streamline Section 106 review for disaster relief projects, and this cooperation has become a model for other federal agencies seeking to balance rebuilding with historic concerns. NY SHPO has also been serving on the Environmental Coordinating and Planning Subcommittee of the Federal Task Force to Rebuild New York City, ensuring that all concerned agencies are carrying out their reviews as quickly and effectively as possible, as well. Plans for each historic site administered by the state in New York clearly define the authority and responsibilities of all essential staff, and delegates their roles in emergency situations. The plan provides procedures for multiple different types of threats, including fire, theft, bomb threats, personal assault, accidents and illness, building and utility failures, and community disasters. Also included are building floor plans, locations of supplies and equipment, and emergency phone numbers. Each plan also has a second volume, entitled *Emergency Salvage and First Aid Information for Collections*, which goes into greater detail, such as how to treat damaged or threatened collections of various types from various different threats. After September 11, many sites have been busy reevaluating their plans, and revising them if

	necessary. But most of these revisions and reevaluations must be carried out on a site-by-site basis, as one solution does not serve the needs of every site. Ms. Castro muses that September 11 provided an increased appreciation of our nation's heritage, and that the role of preservationists is now more important than ever before.
Gallagher, Patricia	**The Closing of Pennsylvania Avenue, Security for Monuments in the Center of Washington, DC.** By **Patricia Gallagher**, AICP, Director, National Capital Planning Commission **Summary of Remarks:** The closing of Pennsylvania Avenue following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 created dead space, a traffic nightmare, and did some harm to the image of the White House. A controversial decision both then and now, many similar ideas are being tossed around in the wake of September 11. To ensure that necessary security changes are enacted in an acceptable way, an Interagency Task Force has been established, and has met 13 times since 9/11. Consisting of the NCPC, the Department of the Interior, the General Services Administration, the Washington, DC Mayor and the DC City Council, the task force has reviewed threats to security, state-of-the-art security technology, traffic problems, and weighed the pros and cons of closures. The latter, in particular, is not something to be taken lightly. Before Pennsylvania Avenue was closed off in the 1990s, 30,000 cars and 13 bus lines traversed the street. Because of the severe disruption such changes can bring, the Urban Design and Security Plan for the Monumental Core was initiated the week before the presentation, with an estimated completion date in six months, seeks to identify special streets and contextual zones with many overlapping historic designations. In order to secure the buildings of the monumental core, several projects have been initiated to improve the security of specific buildings, all the while serving as an example for future projects. Of the Phase One priority projects are the Washington Monument, the Department of Justice, Pennsylvania Avenue from 3rd to 15th Streets, and the area directly in front of the White House. In the case of the Washington Monument, a proposal was already under development and slated for approval at the following month's meeting of the NCPC. As for Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, it was determined that it was necessary for the street to remain closed for the time being, but a beautification project is ready to begin, and the proposal of a tunnel to ease traffic problems is being looked at in detail by the NCPC. The first phase will also include concept plans for several other areas, including Federal Triangle, the National Mall, and downtown DC. The funding request for the entirety of Phase One was $98.5 million. Phase two will begin in October 2002 and continue through January 2004, and move forward on projects currently in the discussion stage.
Grone, Philip W.	**Security at Historic Military Sites** By Philip W. Grone, Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) **Summary of Remarks:** Mr. Grone begins his remarks by recalling the words of President George W. Bush, and reaffirming that though the events of September 11th will not be forgotten, it is imperative

	that Americans get back to their normal lives. He then recalls that on September 11th back in 1941 the sixteen month construction of the Pentagon began, in the end costing $83 million. Now a recognized part of the Washington landscape, the Pentagon was very controversial when first concieved: even then President Franklin Roosevelt thought the design was ugly, and planned to convert the building to storage space when the expanded military staff necessary for the duration of the Second World War could be scaled back. Mr. Grone talks about the archetectural style of the Pentagon (a stripped neo-classical style, much like the neo-classical style of the rest of the capital), and how it was built using concrete made from sand dredged from the Potomac River, and limestone quarried from Bedford, Indiana, and with absolutely no structural steel, saving enough steel to build a battleship. The entire installation was dedicated a National Historic Landmark in 1992, at which point no major renovations had been undertaken since its initial construction. As a result, the Pentagon lacked many of the basic features present at more modern office buildings, including fire sprinklers and personnel elevators, and it possessed an inadequate electrical, heating, cooling, and plumbing system for a building of its size and with the number of employees which utilized its space. To make the Pentagon more amenable to modern users, a large-scale renovation project began in 1994, which will likely continue until 2010, at an estimated cost of $3 billion. Among the projects completed thus far is a remote delivery facility, to deliver supplies and passages by truck, and the first phase of the new Metro entrance, both of which were designed with an eye on force protection. In addition, many of the buildings systems have been updated, including a new Building Operations Command Center, which allows for remote control of building air flow and air pressure, and was built to reflect the Department of Defense's emphasis on energy efficiency. Wedge One of the Pentagon, on the southern side of the building, was the first major renovation of office space in the building. The Army Corps of Engineers, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency worked together to mitigate probable threats to security, all while keeping an eye on the National Historic Preservation Act and the historic nature of the space itself. As an example, the new blast-resistant windows have been modelled after the replaced historic windows, down to the handle bars, which are no longer functional, but remain in order to maintain historical integrity. Similarly, while minor changes had to be wrought to the limestone exterior, all replacement stone originated from the original quarry in Indiana. Steel beams were brought in to reinforce older concrete beams, and fire sprinklers were installed. Although the majority of renovations had been completed by September 2001, Wedge One had not yet been reoccupied, and it was Wedges One and Two (the latter unrenovated) that took the brunt of the damage on September 11th. If not for the security improvements in Wedge One, the damage would likely have been far more significant, with the steel beams preventing progressive collapse, and allowing more time for evacuation, and the blast-resistant windows saved many personnel near the site of the crash from serious injury. Within a month of the attack, the Army Corps of Engineers had produced a report of how the renovations to Wedge One held up to the damage, and that information is already being used to aid in future renovation projects, both at the Pentagon and at other military installations. Congress has since appropriated additional funding to complete the rebuilding of Wedge One, and to move ahead the completion of renovations on other sections of the building by four years. The number of cultural resources under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense is rivalled only by the National Park Service, with 68 National Historic Landmarks, and 14,000 eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Most of these sites remain in day-to-day use by the Department, and many fail to meet safety and security requirements set by Congress. To aid in planning and development of renovations which will address

	these concerns while retaining the cultural significance of the sites, the Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program collects information and helps develop plans for cultural resource management on Defense-held lands. Part of the goal is to integrate cultural resource planning early to increase productivity and effectiveness, with Integrated Cultural Resource Management Plans. Although, following September 11, both President Bush and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation issued orders that allowed cultural resource managed review to be sped up, very few military installations have made use of such expedited reviews. However, the difficulties in balancing both security concerns and historic preservation can be costly. But, despite the cost, the importance of preserving America's legacy of freedom and liberty is great enough that the Department of Defense will continue to strive towards good maintainance of its large numbers of cultural resources.
Hantman, Alan M.	**Security for the US Capitol: An example of the Challenges for Historic Places?** By Alan M. Hantman, FAIA, Architect of the Capitol **Summary of Remarks:** Mr. Hantman begins by identifying the primary balancing act of providing security to historic facilities: such places must remain open and freely accessible, but at the same time they must satisfy security considerations. As Architect of the U.S. Capitol, Mr. Hantman knows the difficulties involved in this balance very well. The Capitol is both an important historic structure, and a vital part of the day-to-day workings of the federal government, and, as such, a potential target for terrorist attacks. The difficulties faced are in no way new: after the destruction of the Capitol in the War of 1812, many congressmen wanted to move the Capitol to a more secure location in another city. It was only President Madison who insisted that the Capitol be rebuilt as it originally was, figuring that the cultural importance of the building outweighed the risk. According to Hantman, security for the Capitol rests on three initiatives: maintaining our open and free society that values the historically and culturally significant, being able to prevent terrorist actions like those on September 11 before they occur, and to learn from our past experiences and defend against both human loss and property damage sustained during terrorist attacks. Mr. Hantman is particularly focused on the third. Updating the perimeter security of the complex, and developing the new Capitol visitors' center. The latter, in particular, serves to both improve security and to increase the learning opportunities afforded to visitors. It will allow for remote screening of visitors, and reduce vehicular access to the exterior of the Capitol, similar to the procedures now in practice at the White House. Furthermore, it will boast improved security systems, and allow for improved circulation of pedestrian traffic, all while remaining aesthetically appropriate for the Capitol location. The perimeter security enhancements seek to improve the boundaries of the Capitol and its associated buildings by utilizing aesthetically pleasing elements, while replacing older, temporary, and unpleasing boundaries with more pleasant examples, all keeping in the spirit of the existing Frederick Law Olmsted landscape design. Both this project, and the visitor's center, utilizes many elements discussed in the NCPC's Designing for Security in the Nation's Capitol. But beyond physical changes, also in effect are improved evacuation procedures and protocols, and providing alternative locations for assembly so that essential activities are not severely interrupted. Building and systems are plans have been made available in numerous secure places, both on- and off-site, which have already been used in responding the anthrax attacks. In-house facility experts are being made available to emergency responders,

	to aid the latter in responding to unique aspects of the site. Also learned was that different types of attack require different methods of response: a chemical-biological attack requires a substantially different response than an airplane hijacking. In closing, Mr. Hantman indicates that the September 11 attacks did not exactly provide a "wake-up call": renovations were already under way, and increased security was already a goal. But what they did do was to add to the urgency of the renovations, and provide a strong impetus for the increased funding that will be necessary to ensure that the security needs of the Capitol are balanced with the need to maintain a society based on values of openness and freedom.
Hitchock, Ann	**Balancing Security needs when Documenting Historic Structures.** By Ann Hitchcock, Chief Curator, National Park Service **Summary of Remarks:** Ms. Hitchcock identifies two concerns regarding documentation of museum collections. Caretakers should recognize the value and importance of documenting museum collections, and should be sure to protect that document when the information it contains is sensitive. Going further, she identifies certain features that all good documentation about museum collections should include, such as: accession and descriptive catalog information, location information, photographic records, records of past conservation and information on hazardous materials, and identification of the priority level in a salvage situation. All this information should be included, and the report itself should be mirrored at multiple locations, both on- and off-site. Records may also include documentation about other resources such as archeological sites, historic structures and natural resources, as well as maps, drawings, plans, and field notes about other resources. These documents are often managed as archival materials and can also benefit from on- and off-site storage. In the event of total loss of a resource, documentation is all that we have left to record that piece of history, and so the value of good documentation cannot be understated. Equally important to producing good documentation, we must struggle to protect that documentation. Controlling information about the resources can help protect the resources from terrorism, theft, and vandalism. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides exemptions for certain classes of federal records, including classified records relating to defense, foreign policy, and intelligence, law enforcement records, geological and geophysical information concerning wells, and materials protected by other statutes. Caretakers should also become familiar with statutes in their state and local governments that offer similar exemptions. Some of the other statutes with specific provisions that allow the withholding of location or information about resources are the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 1979 (16 USC 470), the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 USC 470-474t, 110), the Federal Cave Resources Protection Act of 1988 (16 USC 4301-4309), and the National Park Omnibus Management Act of 1988 (PL 105-391). When responding to requests for information, curators and collection managers should work closely with FOIA officers, and remember that drawings of nationally significant structures, such as the Statue of Liberty, could be useful to terrorists. Those responsible should work with law enforcement, archeologists, historical architects and risk management personnel to strike a balance in providing public access and protecting the resource from harm. This goes for other forms of exhibition as well. In particular, we must also be cautious about exhibiting documents that have sensitive information in museums or on the Web.

Kienle, James T	**Protecting Public Icons** By James T. Kienle, AIA, National Director of Historic Preservation Architecture, HNTB Architecture **Summary of Remarks:** Mr. Kienle's presentation involves the ongoing renovations underway at Kentucky State Capitol, and the impact of the events of September 11th on the work. The Kentucky State Capitol was designed by Frank Mills Andrews in a French Renaissance-influenced Beaux Arts style, and was surrounded by a National Register-listed Olmstead-designed landscape and completed in 1910. The entire complex encompasses 44 acres on a bluff overlooking the Kentucky River. On the grounds of the site are the Capitol, the Capitol Annex office building, and the Governor's residence. Access is controlled in large part by the 1940s residential area located directly across the river from the site. The changes to the approach to security following September 11th were not especially great, and it had long since been decided that the site would remain open to public. The security design process is driven by the need to protect the inhabitants of the site over the site itself, and therefore the site would not be so hardened as to drive away visitors. Over fifty recommendations have been offered by the U.S. Secret Service and another private consulting firm, and have included a hard security barrier in the form of 6" iron fence, an outer and middle perimeter alarms, a CCTV monitoring system, and vehicular check houses. As for the building itself, principle recommendations involved securing all entry points, cutting down the number of visitor entry points to one for each building, separate structures for deliveries, card readers and IDs for personnel, restricted access in certain parts of the building, and CCTV monitoring of all public spaces. Having judged all of these recommendations, the decision was made not to construct perimeter fencing or alarms, limit CCTV monitoring to inside the buildings, and to retain multiple, but controlled, public entries to buildings. It was determined that many of the recommended changes sacrificed the character of the site and portrayed an unacceptable image of the government, and that screening and internal monitoring and alarms provided sufficient protection of the site, its historic contents, and its officials and personnel. In conclusion, the definition of the threat faced by a historic site necessitates differing approaches to security, and that decisions are made in situations like this not by ideal security of preservation standards, but political will.
Lee, Jeff	**Security from Vehicles is more than Installing Bollards: A Case for Pedestrian Zones.** By Jeff Lee, ASLA, Landscape Architect, Lee and Liu Associates **Summary of Remarks:** Disaster situations can be dangerous beyond the obvious, by forcing us to act without appropriate forethought. An appropriate response to a potentially cataclysmic situation must involve several questions. What specific threats are trying to be met? Can restricting vehicular access to a site mitigate the threat? What about the potential for negative impact on downtown businesses? The GSA and other agencies would prefer to have cars kept away

	from buildings, but this has serious implications for traffic. In determining the cost of such changes, one must also factor in the impact it would have on the entire community, and the price that would be paid in that regard. This is a common issue for the capital region. The Architect of the Capital has had the challenge of maintaining open and free access to the Capital building following current renovation projects, including visual access and views, without compromising security. In terms of securing a site with bollard installations, there's the question of what the long-term effects on trees and other objects around the site might be. To avoid problems such as these, the design process must be multidisciplinary, involving both experts in security and design. In Europe, where many city centers were closed, originally to limit traffic and its negative effects (noise, pollution, etc.), these closed areas became great public spaces. In order to make the best out of the necessarily increased security, we should focus not just on "locking down" potential targets, but making them friendly and inviting spaces.
Moravec, F.	**Security and Historic Buildings** By F. Joseph, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration **Summary of Remarks:** Mr. Moravec explains the long history of the GSA as the government's leading provider of real estate services. He indicates that in the years since the bombing of the Alfred B. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City there has been a shift within the administration to reduce the vulnerability of federally owned properties. Moravec assures his audience that the GSA knows of the dangers to our cultural heritage inherent in making irreversible decisions based on acts of terror, and that the administration remains committed to making reasoned, deliberate, and intelligent decisions that reduce the threat while maintaining the cultural significance of the site. For the next part of his presentation, Moravec shows slides of historic buildings in the GSA's public building inventory. Among these properties are: • Alexander Hamilton Customs House, New York, NY • Pension Building, Washington, DC • Jacob Weinberger Courthouse, San Diego, CA • United States Courthouse, San Juan, PR • United States Court of Appeals, San Francisco, CA • United States Courthouse, Providence, RI • United States Courthouse, Scranton, PA Moravec describes the GSA's commitment to safety and security, and tells how the GSA's Federal Protection Service (FPS) continues to ensure the safety of federal employees and citizens doing business with the government on federal property. He tells how the FPS has categorized all GSA buildings in accordance with the Department of Justice's Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities of June 1995, and used that project as the starting point for thousands of security upgrades at nationwide GSA facilities. Turning to the terrorist attacks of September 11, Moravec reminds his audience that the GSA safely managed to evacuate 2,800 federal workers from the World Trade Center, and quickly

	provided a million square feet of workspace for the Department of Defense to replace space lost at the Pentagon. He also tells of how the GSA is busy filling the gaps illustrated by the attacks, and will continue to upgrade building security as necessary. Committed to producing physical environments that remain psychologically pleasant and safe, Moravec describes some of the GSA's biggest challenges and greatest successes. Dense concentrations of federal space, like the Dirksen Building complex in Chicago, IL, pose a serious challenge, since the threat of truck or car bombs breaching the perimeter, as was the case in Oklahoma City, is greatest. To secure these complexes, the GSA issued the Interagency Security Committee's Security Design Criteria, which calls for the hardening of building walls using blast-resistant glass and structural reinforcement. Turning to historic structures, Moravec tells of the GSA's dual commitment to security and to ensuring that timeless aesthetics are not damaged in the process. The Secretary of the Interior's Standards for Rehabilitation are a good starting point, instructing that changes be reversible and distinguishable, but compatible, with original features. Other ideas, such as incorporating barriers into landscape design and garden walls, or using trees as a natural perimeter barrier, are also being utilized. To protect against blast-related injuries, several options, such as coating windows with fragment-resistant film, replacing older windows with laminated glass windows, and roll-down blast curtains similar to window shades (which are being used to redesign the US Post Office and Courthouse in Brooklyn, NY). Several of these options provide benefits other than just security, as well: ARPAL laminated glass (in use at the IRS Building in Washington, DC) conserves energy by reducing temperature loss and gain, and is mostly indistinguishable from non-laminated windows. Previous attempts to improve security in historic sites may have resulted in accidental reduction in the accessibility and aesthetic qualities of the site, which the GSA now seeks to repair through its First Impressions program, and calling for streamlined design of security devices which do not clutter entrance lobbies. The GSA recommends that visitors not be asked to enter such buildings through secondary "back door" entrances, and to keep security devices from intruding into ceremonial lobbies. Moravec closes by drawing attention to the many cooperative initiatives the GSA has taken part in, including a December 2001 symposium with the AIA, and participation in the NCPC's interagency study on Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital. He remarks that future threats, such as biochemical terrorism, are a serious issue for the GSA, and he invites further cooperation between other agencies and private organization in ensuring that these threats are met in a satisfactory way with an eye kept on the responsibilities of historic and cultural preservation.
Gallagher, Patricia	**<u>The Closing of Pennsylvania Avenu: Security for the Seat of Government</u>** By **Patricia Gallagher**, AICP, Director, **<u>Summary of Remarks:</u>** The closing of Pennsylvania Avenue following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 created dead space, a traffic nightmare, and did some harm to the image of the White House. A

	controversial decision both then and now, many similar ideas are being tossed around in the wake of September 11. To ensure that necessary security changes are enacted in an acceptable way, an Interagency Task Force has been established, and has met 13 times since 9/11. Consisting of the NCPC, the Department of the Interior, the General Services Administration, the Washington, DC Mayor and the DC City Council, the task force has reviewed threats to security, state-of-the-art security technology, traffic problems, and weighed the pros and cons of closures. The latter, in particular, is not something to be taken lightly. Before Pennsylvania Avenue was closed off in the 1990s, 30,000 cars and 13 bus lines traversed the street. Because of the severe disruption such changes can bring, the Urban Design and Security Plan for the Monumental Core was initiated the week before the presentation, with an estimated completion date in six months, seeks to identify special streets and contextual zones with many overlapping historic designations. In order to secure the buildings of the monumental core, several projects have been initiated to improve the security of specific buildings, all the while serving as an example for future projects. Of the Phase One priority projects are the Washington Monument, the Department of Justice, Pennsylvania Avenue from 3rd to 15th Streets, and the area directly in front of the White House. In the case of the Washington Monument, a proposal was already under development and slated for approval at the following month's meeting of the NCPC. As for Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, it was determined that it was necessary for the street to remain closed for the time being, but a beautification project is ready to begin, and the proposal of a tunnel to ease traffic problems is being looked at in detail by the NCPC. The first phase will also include concept plans for several other areas, including Federal Triangle, the National Mall, and downtown DC. The funding request for the entirety of Phase One was $98.5 million. Phase two will begin in October 2002 and continue through January 2004, and move forward on projects currently in the discussion stage.
Podany, Jerry C.	**Disaster Preparedness and Response for Collections** By Jerry C. Podany, Head of the Department of Antiquities Conservation, the J. Paul Getty Museum **Summary of Remarks:** Though the risk of sudden, unexpected disasters will remain with us always, and even though such catastrophes can catch us unprepared, preservationists should not disregard the importance of good preparedness and response plans. Such plans allow for time to contemplate and respond to the unexpected disasters, and aid in making decisions in such a situation, because the knowledge and information learned during the process of developing a good plan can be useful even if the subsequent plans fail to be of as much use as one might hope. Mr. Podany remembers the time when he first entered the field of disaster preparedness and response, in the mid 1980s, and how terrorism was not considered a serious risk at that time. Now, obviously, no one can discount the dangers posed by terrorism to our cultural heritage. But although the specific threat may be a largely unfamiliar one, in practice it shares many similarities with traditional disasters, and the risks, such as fire, flood, explosive force, or whatever, are familiar from previous experience. Numerous documents and guides exist to aid in such situations, released by numerous agencies such as the National Park Service, the Getty museum, and the American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works. An effective disaster plan should not remain inflexible: it should be a living, constantly

	evolving document. It is the process of developing and keeping that plan up-to-date that provides the most valuable results. This process draws together numerous individuals, and keeps the awareness of risks fresh in the minds of those who need to be concerned. Changing situations, mistakes in the original plan, and other "bugs" to be ironed out make the revision process not only essentially, but unending. By engaging in such a process, one has the chance to become intimately aware with what can be done to reduce the potential damage wrought by a threat, and to use this information to reduce vulnerability in the first place. As an example, Mr. Podany cites the example of a collection of glass products being stored in a seismically active area. In evaluating the risks and developing a plan to deal with the result of an earthquake, one would realize that actions must be taken to reduce the chances of these glass objects from breaking in the event, either by moving them to a more stable location, or developing special mounts to secure them. To develop an effective plan, one must identify four things: 1. Identify the threats that could potentially damage your collection. 2. Identify the resources necessary to respond quickly and effectively. 3. Develop priorities in responding (i.e. should the safety of visitors come before the safety of the collection itself?) 4. Consider obligations to the surrounding community (i.e. is your building likely to be called upon to serve as a shelter?) A well-designed plan will assign responsibilities to a certain position, not a certain individual. If a disaster response plan requires than one uniquely trained individual out of all others be present, than serious problems could arise if said individual is not available when he or she is needed. Someone should always be able to "fill in" if necessary. No damage to cultural collections should be seen as an acceptable loss. Risk should be reduced as far as risk can conceivably be reduced, and there must always be a well-oiled and effective plan for preventing, mitigating, and responding to the damage that can be wrought to our nation's heritage, be it from catastrophic terrorist attacks like those on September 11, or simple ignorance and neglect on the part of those who should be responsible for maintaining these treasures as an important part of our cultural identity.
Ruan, Yvette	**Anti-Terrorist Response at the Golden Gate Bridge after September 11.** By Yvette Ruan, Chief Ranger, Golden Gate National Recreation Area, National Park Service **Summary of Remarks:** Yvette Ruan spoke on the impact of recent events on Fort Point as part of a joint presentation with Kary Witt, her neighbor from the Golden Gate Bridge. Fort Point stands immediately beneath a massive arch of the Golden Gate Bridge's east approach between the first pier on the San Francisco shoreline and the bridge anchorage. Fort Point could not get any closer and was even at risk of being demolished during the bridge's early design phases except for the ingenuity of the bridge designers who developed the concept of spanning over the fort and thus preserving it. Fort Point was built in the Civil War and was part of the important complex of shoreline fortifications built on both sides of the Golden Gate to defend it and the harbor beyond. After being abandoned for military use, it was transferred to the National Park Service in 1971 and

	serves now as a major recreational site for interpreting history and as a vista point and access point to many recreational trails. On September 11, 2001, Ruan reported that information was slow in coming at first after she had arrived at the fort around 6:30 AM Pacific time, shortly after the second jetliner had hit the other World Trade Center tower. Once the scope of the disasters on the East Coast became more clear, emergency plans went into high gear very quickly with a total lockdown of the Fort Point site being accomplished within the hour by 7:30 Pacific time. The National Park Service already had emergency plans in hand as recent planning work focused on the Fort's prospect as a major site of Year 2000 Millennium celebrations. The existing emergency plans had been revised and updated as part of this earlier planning the year before and the needed actions to take were fresh in everyone's mind. As part of the Millennium celebration planning, the National Park Service had also been coordinating planning and proposed actions with the other agencies mentioned in Kary Witt's presentation. Ruan recounted the important lessons learned beginning with the prior coordination and familiarization of the various agencies. The players were known to each other and had developed a good working relationship. As part of the National Park Service's standard procedure in the event of an emergency, Ruan described the Incident Command System, or "ICS." The ICS is an action plan which is flexible and fluid in its basic character responding to the particular event at hand. The ICS team includes the leader, or Incident Commander, and a public information officer or team. The Incident Commander provides the direction and gives orders. The public information official is very important in serving as the link to the rest of the world. Communication with the other agencies within the coalition and with the larger community around the Golden Gate Bridge and Fort Point has been recognized as being critical to success. Ruan summarized the lessons as having several key components: preplanning, coalition team building, and recognizing the different missions of the various team players.
Schmuecker, Brian	**Security in State Department Buildings Overseas: Historic Preservation Concerns and Methods** By Brian Schmuecker, RA, Department of State **Summary of Remarks:** The State Department's Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is located in Washington and has the responsibility of ensuring that foreign diplomats have access to necessary facilities (especially offices and residences), and of keeping said facilities both secure and functional. A small but not insignificant percentage of this property is of cultural significance, and is listed on the Secretary of State's Register for Culturally Significant Property, including the Talleyrand Hotel in Paris, Winfield House in London, Twin Villas in Rome, and the American Legation in Seoul. More properties are candidates for listing, including chanceries in Budapest, Kazakhstan, Athens, New Delhi, and London. The Department of State maintains a rigorous list of security requirements for OBO-maintained properties. First, the property must pass physical security requirements, securing the property and individuals therein from forced entry, ballistics, and mob attack. These arrangements usually include, but are not limited to, non-climbable fencing and base designed to prevent and withstand vehicular attack on the property perimeter, and forced-

	entry, ballistic-resistant (FE/BR) construction on the building itself. Secondly, the State Department requires that all new buildings meet standards of blast-resistant design, and that existing buildings are reevaluated as well. If massive renovation is impractical or unreasonable, setback tactics can be utilized to ensure that vehicular access is limited, and that crowds are well controlled. In some cases, the State Department has actually purchased surrounding property to ensure a secure perimeter to its properties. To reduce vulnerability further, studies can be conducted to determine how the building would respond to a blast, and these findings can then be integrated into mitigation strategies, which can include coating windows with shatter-resistant window film (SRWF), or to replace said windows entirely with more blast-resistant varieties. Most usefully to historic properties, technical security, including alarm systems, access control systems, and CCTV monitoring, can be adapted to almost any building, regardless of age or significance. One potential hurdle faced, though, is that some of these measures, particularly CCTV systems, require a certain level of light that may not be compatible with the character of the culturally significant structure. In cases like these, systems with increased photosensitivity are being opted for more and more over increasing the light of the area itself. Finally, simply instituting operational changes, such as using off-site collection of visa fees, or requiring appointments to conduct business or diplomatic functions can mitigate many risks. By way of example, Mr. Schmuecker cites several different case studies, including the Dublin chancery. The chancery was built in the 1960s at the center of a city park, without major concerns regarding security. Recent changes in attitude have necessitated the construction of an unsightly perimeter fence in the 1990s, which sparked public outcry. Since then, the State Department has judged it necessary to build a pre-screening facility, but this time is consulting with the local community before engaging in any significant and irreversible changes to the landscape. In conclusion, having a coherent and studied security plan itself can be a major deterrence factor, by conveying a sense of order and awareness. And a well-designed plan will take into consideration the cultural significance of the properties it seeks to protect
Somerville, Nancy C.	**Talking Points on the Security Design Coalition** By Nancy C. Somerville, Executive Vice President, American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA) **Summary of Remarks:** Ms. Somerville began by emphasizing the importance ensuring the security of our nation's public spaces and structures in such a way that the public retains access to said spaces. Although she agrees that security measures can be vitally important in deterring and preventing future acts of violence, she warns that they can also scare off citizens, and drive a wedge between the public and civic institutions, not to mention potentially doing irreparable harm to culturally significant locations. The newly formed Security Design Coalition (consisting of representatives from ASLA, the American Planning Association, Scenic America, the American Institute of Architects, the Greater Washington Board of Trade, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Downtown DC Business Improvement District, the Society for Environmental Graphic Design, and the National Association of Regional Councils), she explains, is taking the lead in advocating and educating policy makers in regards to socially and culturally sound security design practices. In addition, the SDC advocates for funding necessary to implement good security design measures, believing in the benefits of good security design in maintaining a healthy regional economy.

	The SDC's principles of good security design include: 1. Public places should maintain a sense of vitality and convey the openness of our democratic system. 2. Freedom of movement and access must be maintained, especially to governmental institutions and processes, such as Congress. 3. Security measures should be carried out in a manner respectful to the historic nature of a site. 4. Security professionals should cooperate with design professionals in developing new security measures. 5. Public places must be designed to attract people, not repel them. Somerville commends the work to date of the National Capital Planning Commission, and urges them to continue a public dialogue on the issue, despite the time consuming qualities of such a relationship. In closing, she outlines the ongoing issue of funding as the most important thing facing the SDC, and everyone interested in sound design.
Steer, John R.	**<u>"Crimes against Cultural Resource:" Using Legal Tools</u>** By John R. Steer, General Counsel and Vice Chair, United States Sentencing Commission **<u>Summary of Remarks:</u>** Mr. Steer describes his longstanding interest in historic preservation, dating back to his time as legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond a quarter century ago, where he worked on legislation to establish historic sites in South Carolina. He describes the focus of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the field as using federal criminal law against criminals who steal, damage, or destroys cultural resources. To this end, the Commission has recently published a new sentencing policy specially tailored to cultural resource crimes, as well as revised penalties for terrorism offenses that might affect cultural sites and other resources. The U.S.S.C. was created by 1984's Sentencing Reform Act, and is a seven member, bipartisan commission charged with setting mandatory guidelines to establish narrower ranges of punishment to be used by federal judges. Except in atypical cases, the guideline sentence must be the sentence served, as Congress also abolished parole in the same act. The goals of the law were to alleviate sentencing disparity amongst similar defendants who commit similar crimes, to enforce just punishment, to deter other crimes, and to allow for the rehabilitation of offenders in cases where imprisonment was not necessary. The guidelines established by Commission cover almost all federal crimes, including theft, property destruction, assaults, and national security offenses, as well as including common aggravating and mitigating factors, and other characteristics of the defendant and his/her criminal history. Generally speaking, the guidelines are relevant to about 60,000 cases per year. Recent amendments have been concerned with the fact that crimes against cultural resources are treated equally with other property crimes. Though the number of cases affecting cultural resources each year is comparatively small (about 200), the Commission believes them to be more important, because of the significance of the target, and that current guidelines do not put enough emphasis on the cultural value (as opposed to monetary value) of them. The Commission's new guideline covers theft, property damage or destruction, and illicit trafficking in cultural resources at national memorials, historic sites, landmarks, parks, and other archaeological resources (such as Native American burial

	grounds). The guidelines, developed in conjunction with the Department of Justice, the National Park Service, and other groups, treat these crimes as being more serious from the start, and enhances punishment on basis of commercial or archaeological value, location committed, specific resources (such as human remains), and whether the crime was committed for money. In addition, the U.S.S.C. is responsible for implementation of the Patriot Act, and for the repercussions of terrorist attacks against cultural resources. All of the Committee's pending guidelines are available for public comment, and Mr. Steer closes by reminding his audience that copies of the Cultural Heritage Resource Amendment are available from the Commission.
Stubbs, John H.	**Our Endangered Heritage** By John H. Stubbs, Vice President, World Monuments Fund **Summary of Remarks:** Mr. Stubbs summarized topics from previous lectures as follows: Bernadette Castro's model for streamlining the work of a SHPO in times of adversity, congratulating the cooperative efforts of public officials, private citizens, and national leaders following the events of September 11. Philip Grone's description of the architectural and engineering analyses of the effects of the September 11 attacks on the renovated parts of the Pentagon, and how these analyses will serve as a model for future renovations to various structures. Alan Hantman's description of how previously learned lessons and security design practices are being put into place for the new site security designs for the Capitol. Stubbs suggests that the ACHP and FPI draft Guidance for Development of Security Measures Affecting Historic Places will prove immensely useful in the redesign of the Capitol, as well as other structures and complexes. Particularly attention is given to how its message of not allowing unsightly interim security measures become permanent should be heeded by all. Attempting to put historic preservation's post-9/11 dilemmas into a larger world context is a worthwhile, but extremely difficult goal. Thousands of heritage conservation efforts occur each day around the world, and each faces its own unique challenges, and attempts to paint a complete portrait of all efforts are essentially impossible, especially with the recent explosion of growth in the heritage preservation field. But certain things are important to all of these efforts, regardless of their unique situations. Documenting and categorizing historic places, like with the National Register of Historic Places, is a straightforward, but unending, job of vital importance. Historic places face two major categories of risk, natural (fire, flood, earthquake, storm, etc.) and man-made (war, vandalism, pollution, poor planning, etc.). But, though the risks are finite, new and unconsidered challenges emerge all the time. Even more challenging are combinations of threats (earthquakes which start fires, etc.), where the possibilities are far less limited.

	Struggles to maintain cultural heritage are by no means new. History is replete with examples of threats of both of the above types to historic structures, and with attempts to preserve or document endangered sites. Stubbs cites examples ranging from the reconstruction of a Babylonian palace in 526 BC by King Nebuchadnezzar, to the numerous times the Greek Parthenon was rebuilt, all three versions of which were either lost or damaged by war. In particular, World War II provided many examples of historic destruction and preservation, including local attempts to document Warsaw's Old Town before Hitler's imminent destruction of the area during the Second World War. Indeed, many attempts to rebuild following WWII continue to this day, including reconstruction of the Fraunenkirche in Dresden, and the Reichstag in Berlin. Even more recently the world was delivered a nasty reminder that heritage protection afforded by international agreement like the Blue Shield provision of the Hague Convention are meaningless if combatants choose to ignore them, as was often the case in the breakup of former Yugoslavia. In situations like these, even documentation of historic properties serves little use, as ethnic conflict continues to prevent any rebuilding efforts from being feasible. In order to best respond to the challenges faced in the post-September 11th world, government officials must move quickly, lest they lose the overwhelming mandate afforded by the public, and to engage in an ongoing international dialogue on matters of cultural preservation. Stubbs emphasizes the possibilities in making heritage protection an integral part of our foreign policy, citing French and Japanese projects in Southeastern Asia. Heritage preservation faces new challenges undreamed of a few years earlier. But, as daunting as the prospect is, American heritage preservation has long been the envy of much of the rest of the world, and American preservationists, have proven themselves capable to rising to the occasion in the past.
Thomas, Edward A.	**Historic Preservation as a Part of Response and Recovery operations after a Disaster.** By Edward A. Thomas, JD, director of the Administration and Resource Planning Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency **Summary of Remarks:** Mr. Thomas talked about his own interest in preserving America's heritage, including an anecdote regarding how historic Fort Halifax on the Kennebec River in Maine disappeared following a 1987 flood, and how the landmark would have been forever lost had FEMA representatives not recognized the later debris that washed up at the mouth of river as the wreckage of the fort. Also related is the story of multiple natural disasters in 1991 which threatened the historic districts of Montpelier, Vermont and how Hurricane Bob threatened the National Historic Landmark district comprising the entirety of the island of Nantucket. Having learned from these experiences, FEMA, working with preservationists, prepared a guidebook called Safeguarding Your Historic Site: Basic Preparedness and Recovery Measures for Natural Disasters, now in use by FEMA headquarters, geared toward teaching proper response to disasters in historically and culturally significant areas. In 1996, FEMA, in conjunction with the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), and the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management, held a workshop to allow cultural resources managers to share their knowledge and experience with their fellows. From this workshop came the Massachusetts Cultural Resources Disaster Planning and Mitigation Task Force, which currently works to provide institutions with information regarding developing disaster plans, and to integrate cultural resource information into the state of Massachusetts's disaster plan. Mr. Thomas also explains how

	FEMA provides Saving History Information Sheets as simple guides for small cultural institutions faced with the threat of castastrophic damage to cultural resources, and provides the audience with information and how to signup for copies of these sheets. Though saving human life remains the priority of disaster response organizations like FEMA, this need not be mutually exclusive to preserving cultural heritage. The worst damage to historic sites can be reduced simply be ensuring that the site is well maintained and that policy makers, preservationists, and public officials have an appropriate disaster plan for addressing issues that would be likely to arise, all of which requires both a studied and coordinated response, as well as an up-to-date survey and inventory of historic resources affected. But, even with a well-developed plan, to effectively safeguard against disaster, preservation personnel must be able to think on their feet when a disaster arises, and encouraged to do so. A truly effective preservation movement will make strong ties with federal, state, and local governments and communities well before the advent of disaster, and work to educate said groups in how they can work towards safeguarding cultural heritage by remaining in constant communication with these groups. To this end, preservationists much reach out to those who do not share their professional interests, and remain vigilant at all times.
	Planning in Advance of a Disaster. By Richard Wilcox, Chief of Police, Stockbridge, MS **Summary of Remarks:** After a lengthy introduction, Mr. Wilcox begins by reminding his audience that disasters can strike cultural resources suddenly and at any time. He recounts a story from May 1998 when he was given less than thirty minutes of warning that a tornado would strike Stockbridge. After that point, Stockbridge's Emergency Management Plan has undergone numerous revisions and reevaluations, to correct the failures of the plan in addressing urgent situations like the above. One of the most essential elements of a good disaster plan is simplicity. The plan should be comprehensive, but concise and to-the-point. In an emergency situation, first responders should be able to quickly read over the plan and put that information to use. A document that is too long will take too long to read, and potentially cripple the response team. Furthermore, he goes on to state that "all disasters are local," meaning that the circumstances, and appropriate responses, to a disaster will be different from place to place. By way of example, Mr. Wilcox explains a good disaster management plan by telling the story of a chimney fire at his home, a local disaster. His first move was to prioritize his actions: first call the fire department, then make sure that his family was safe (human life being the number one priority). Because there had been little communication regarding what to rescue in the event of a disaster, his book collection was put at risk. Having faced the situation, then, led to an update process to correct the failures of the first time around. Even so, a failed plan is better than no plan at all. An effective plan is always undergoing revision as circumstances change, and should never be considered "finished." Mr. Wilcox's second story involved a tornado hitting close to his home, and example of a widespread natural disaster. While his family was moving their possessions to the relative safety of the basement, the issue was raised over what to do with the family horse.

	Ultimately, they could not fit the horse into the basement, and Mr. Wilcox points out that this would have been made much easier if they had maintained an inventory of their possessions, as well as a site map and floor plan. In conclusion, Mr. Wilcox summarizes his points by using the phrase PPRLUCK: plan, prioritizing, relationships, local, updating, communication, and KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid).
Wypijewski, Anne Marie	**Resolving Conflicts between Wireless Communications Towers and Historic Preservation.** By Anne Marie Wypijewski, NEPA Attorney, Commercial Wireless Division, Federal Communications Commission **Summary of Remarks:** Ms. Wypijewski focused on the construction of wireless communications towers on or near historically / culturally significant sites. As an example, she cites the construction of a public safety communications tower in Ellicott City. The site chosen was controversial for its close proximity to historically important areas, and so a work-stop order was issued to allow for further research to be done, and to ensure the tower met its requirements under the National Historic Preservation Act. The best way to ensure that historic preservation requirements are met by projects such as these is to forge strong working relationships with other agencies.
Young, Bob	**The Role of the Mayor in Disaster Planning** By the Honorable Bob Young, Mayor of Augusta, GA **Summary of Remarks:** Mayor Young explained how mayors act as protectors of their communities, and how every major local issues stops at city hall. He then went on to briefly explain the history of Augusta, a historic city chartered in 1736 that has had much of its past destroyed by various disasters, including flood, fire, and plain old negligence. In the past forty years, however, more attention has been paid to restoration work. Many of Augusta's historic properties are significant financial investments with large economic payoffs, and even more are irreplaceable, including pre-Revolutionary War homes, and artifacts from the Civil War. These properties should be treated with respect and celebrated as the important parts of history that they are, which means that they should be accessible to the public, but they must also be protected. Terrorists don't recognize the importance of these sites, as evidence by the destruction of ancient Buddha statues in Afghanistan during the summer of 2001, and will attack such sites without hesitation. In order to combat attacks of this sort, local officials need to some level of technical proficiency. In order to so educate said officials, there must be a central point for disseminating information, conferences on the regional level, and technical assistance through threat assessment surveys. Working together, we can preserve and protect our past for generations to come.